We introduce a model of two-sided statistical discrimination in which worker and firm beliefs are complementary. Firms try to infer whether workers have made investments required for them to be productive, and simultaneously, workers try to deduce whether firms have made investments necessary for them to thrive. When multiple equilibria exist, group differences can be generated and sustained by either side of the interaction -workers or firms. Strategic complementarity complicates both empirical analysis designed to detect discrimination and policy meant to alleviate it. Affirmative action is much less effective than in traditional statistical discrimination models. More generally, we demonstrate the futility of one-sided policies to correct gender and racial disparities. We analyze a two-sided version of "investment insurance" -a policy in which the government (after observing a noisy version of the employer's signal) offers to hire any worker who it believes to be qualified and whom the employer does not offer a job -and show that in our model it (weakly) dominates any alternative. The paper concludes by proposing a way to identify statistical discrimination when beliefs are complements.
Introduction
Strategic complements, a term coined by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) , refer to decisions of at least two players that mutually reinforce one another. As Bulow et al. (1985) write, conventional substitutes and complements can be distinguished by whether a more "aggressive" strategy by firm A (e.g., a lower price in price competition or greater quantity in quantity competition) lowers or raises firm B's total profits.
Strategic substitutes or complements are analagously defined by whether a more "aggressive" strategy by A lowers or raises B's marginal profits.
Given the complex history of gender and racial discrimination in the United States (and most every country), it is natural to think of worker and firm actions as strategic complements. Examples abound.
Statistical discrimination against women may be generated by employers' asymmetric beliefs about the competence of men and women. Or, perhaps given a history of inflexibility and bias, women believe that employers will treat them unfairly. Expecting unfair treatment, women may invest in a way that causes them to be hired less (even if employers' initial beliefs were homogeneous), which confirms their initial suspicions.
Similarly, police may discriminate against minorities. Or, minorities -based on a past fraught with racial tensions and overt discrimination -may be more likely to be non-compliant or flee in interactions with the police because they fear for their own safety. This makes law enforcement officials (who, again, may have had homogeneous initial beliefs) treat them more harshly, confirming minorities' initial beliefs.
In this paper, we build a model in which worker and firm actions are strategic complements vis-a-vis a two-sided statistical discrimination model. 1 Nature distributes costs of investment to workers and firms.
We think of worker investment as classical Becker (1964) human capital. Firm investment is a fixed cost of creating a work environment conducive to workers (e.g. flexible work hours for women or affinity groups for minority workers). 2 Workers (resp. firms) observe their costs and decide whether to invest. Conditional on this investment, nature distributes a signal to firms (regarding worker investment) and another to workers (regarding firm investment). Then workers, given their beliefs and observed signal, choose whether to apply to firms and, conditional upon receiving an application, firms decide whether to hire. Intuitively, our model nests the classic one-sided treatment of statistical discrimination (e.g., Coate and Loury, 1993) , in that the equilibria in those models always exist in our model if the rate of firm investment is approximately fixed, which shuts down the strategic complementarity. But, as our preceding discussion suggests, when workers are sufficiently pessimistic about firm investment, statistical discrimination can be generated and sustained by that worker pessimism.
The latter may have historical significance. Imagine that racial inequality in the 20 th century was 1 It is important to note at the outset that our game is not supermodular. There is not a strategic complementarity between every worker and every firm, but there is strategic complementary between sides (workers and firms). 2 In the main model, we assume this cost is fixed. In section 8.3.2, we provide some intuition for how results change if costs are proportional to the number of hires. generated by explicit racism and discrimination in almost every aspect of life. Parts of the South were plastered with signs that read "Negroes need not apply" (U.S. Congress 1963 ). In our model, this might lead to a zero investment equilibrium: employers discriminate against blacks and, as a best response, black workers decide it does not make economic sense to invest. Now imagine that with the signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers stopped discriminating in hiring and adopted homogeneous beliefs, but workers were not convinced firms were amenable to minority workers. In traditional models of discrimination, minority outcomes improve immediately. In our model, however, even if employers had homogeneous beliefs immediately following the civil rights legislation, the equilibrium remains unchanged. Minorities, after years of subjugation, continue to believe that firms are hostile to minority workers and consequently do not invest.
If they don't invest, employers adjust their beliefs downward.
Our model may similarly help explain variation in gender gaps across occupations and over time. For example, Goldin and Katz (2016) argue that jobs in pharmacy have become more flexible and family-friendly due to changes in technology and the reorganization of work. In our model, these changes could be viewed as having increased the fraction of firms who have made the "female-specific investments" required for women to flourish. It should not therefore be surprising that pharmacy has simultaneously experienced a rise in the ratio of female to male earnings and higher female participation rates. In turn, more female participation has likely increased the benefits to making workplaces female friendly, reinforcing this trend. Moreover, it may help explain the patterns in Gruber (1994) .
Strategic complementarity is the key economics underlying the model. This, and the resulting potential for coordination failure, complicate both empirical analyses designed to unearth the sources of intergroup disparities and policies meant to alleviate them. Nonetheless, we show that some, though not all, empirical tests for employer bias remain valid under plausible assumptions. 3 In models of statistical discrimination without such strategic complementarity (e.g., classic one-sided models), affirmative action -in the sense of a requirement that firms make job offers to members of both groups with the same probability -leads to homogeneous employer beliefs when lower hiring standards do not undermine worker investment (Coate and Loury 1993) . However, negative stereotypes about minorities can persist indefinitely if low standards are too de-motivating. 4 Affirmative action can have the same issues in our model. But worse, affirmative action can undermine firm investment incentives and ultimately trigger zero investment by minority workers. Such severe inequality can be sustained indefinitely in our model, despite affirmative action. Moreover, it may simply be impossible for affirmative action to eliminate discrimination because firms have less incentive to invest in a numerical minority if investment costs are fixed.
We also show how a more ambitious form of affirmative action -employment quotas -can cause firms to be overly aggressive in their attempts to hire minority workers, which can severely undermine minority worker investment, as well as harming the majority. Wage and employment subsidies can also be detrimental.
Generally, we demonstrate a kind of "impossibility result" -any policy that targets a single side of the market (employers or workers) will be ineffective. This result stems naturally from the two-sided nature of our model and the complex web weaved by the complementarity between worker and firm beliefs. Workers fail to invest both because of harsh hiring standards and because they are pessimistic about how they would fare in the workplace if they were hired. At the same time, firms are hesitant to make investments to support minority workers both because they think they are unqualified and because minorities are not applying.
Consistent with this result, we provide suggestive evidence that two-sided policies are more effective at increasing the wages of disadvantaged groups. We focus on recent examples of job training programs (e.g., Year Up and Per Scholas) that have been unusually successful at increasing wages for disadvantaged youth. These programs combine worker investment with additional signals to firms, while at the same time demonstrating to workers that firms are investing. We argue that these programs are consistent with the policies suggested by our model. Firms can be more confident that workers have the relevant cognitive and non-cognitive skills to be successful, and workers know that their investments will pay off because they are matched with an employer with demand for their type.
Randomized evaluations of Year Up and Per Scholas demonstrate that treatment youth earn, on average, 30% more than control youth (Roder and Elliot 2014, Hendra, Greenberg, Hamilton, et al. 2016) . In an analysis of 207 other (one-sided) job training programs in Card (2015) , the treatment effect on monthly earnings is 9.3%. We view this evidence as preliminary and incomplete, but coupled with the model, these results may help design future programs.
We propose a new policy -which we label "investment insurance" -as a simple solution to statistical discrimination. Imagine that the government can observe a noisy version of the signals employers and workers receive and offers them contracts. If the government believes an individual invested, it will subsidize them.
The same assurance is provided to employers regarding their investment. This provides assurance to both workers and firms that their investments will pay off. Our main result is that this weakly dominates any other policy -including affirmative action, employment quotas or wage subsidies -in our model. 5 Unlike these other policies, investment insurance can never be harmful to minority workers. Quite to the contrary, we show that there is always a policy of this type that leads to full equality and in (weakly) less time than any alternative. The economics of this policy is similar to the concept of 'insulating tariffs' as discussed by Weyl (2010) : the government effectively acts as a monopolist who can choose any equilibrium by insulating both workers and firms from uncertainty about participation by the other side. 6 The paper concludes by using our model to derive an empirical test for statistical discrimination by 5 An analog also dominates affirmative action in traditional one-sided statistical discrimination models. 6 We are grateful to Jesse Shapiro for pointing out this connection. employers. The test builds conceptually on the work of Altonji and Pierret (2001) , Lang and Lehmann (2012) , and Fryer, Pager and Spenkuch (2013). However, it is designed specifically to be robust to the confounds of worker belief formation and complementarity between firm and worker investment. Our analysis focuses directly on the mechanism through which rational stereotyping affects incentives: pessimistic employers shrink their estimates of worker productivity toward the group mean, causing a flattening of the relationship between productivity and wages. Based on this insight, we propose examining workers who switch firms.
Under the assumption that firms gain some private information about a worker's ability with tenure, we demonstrate that wage profiles should flatten more for minority than majority workers when they move.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the literature. Section 3 introduces our model and derives the basic implications of two-sided statistical discrimination and how it differs from traditional one-sided models. Section 4 discusses policies such as affirmative action, employment quotas, and wage subsidies. Section 5 considers two-sided policies. Sections 6 describes empirical implications of the two-sided approach. Section 7 concludes. Section 8, an Online Appendix, contains technical proofs, derivations omitted from the main analysis, and extensions of the basic model.
A Brief Review of the Literature
Our paper lies at the intersection of two important literatures: models of discrimination and models with strategic complementarities. 7 We briefly discuss each in turn.
A. Models of Discrimination
The two main theories of discrimination are a theory based on tastes pioneered by Becker (1957) and a statistical theory posited by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) . 8 Statistical models rely on imperfect observability of a worker's productivity to account for employers' use of a worker's group identity in their decision making. Phelps (1972) assumes available measures of productivity to be noisier for minority workers. One prediction of this model -developed by Aigner and Cain (1977) -is that there will be a wage gap at the top of the income distribution favoring whites and another gap at the bottom of the income distribution favoring blacks. Arrow (1973) demonstrates that statistical discrimination can occur even when there is no such unexplained group heterogeneity. The key insight in Arrow (1973) is that when employee productivity is endogenous, employer prejudice can be self-fulfilling. 7 Our work is also related to the literature on two-sided markets: e.g., Caillaud and Jullien (2003) , Rochet and Tirole (2003) , Anderson and Coate (2005) , Armstrong (2006) and Weyl (2010) . The labor market in our game could be viewed as a 'platform', with each side (workers vs. firms) benefiting from participation by the other. Strategic interactions are complicated in our model by imperfect information but this complementarity between sides is fundamental to the model and our policy recommendations. 8 See Fang and Moro (2011) for a nice review of models of discrimination.
An important contribution to this literature is Coate and Loury (1993) who formalize the insights in Arrow (1973) using a job assignment model in the spirit of Milgrom and Oster (1987 
B. Strategic Complementarities
As mentioned in the Introduction, the terms strategic complements and strategic substitutes were first 9 There are also parallels between our model and others in which two sides invest before being matched. For example, Noldeke and Samuelson (2015) develop a model with simultaneous investment followed by ex post matching. Although information is complete in their context, the models share a complementarity in decisions that underlies inefficient equilibria. 10 Another related paper is Filippin (2009) . In this model, unequal opportunities between groups are self-fulfilling, but driven by incorrect minority worker beliefs. Minority workers, perhaps due to a history of poor treatment, believe incorrectly that employers are biased. This causes them to supply low levels of effort, which precludes them from being promoted. Since minority workers never provide high levels of effort, they never observe whether they would have been promoted. 11 Alternative tests have been suggested in other contexts. For example, Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) use search and success rates to test for racial discrimination in searches for contraband by police officers. used by Bulow et al. (1985) who used the two concepts to shed light on results in oligopoly theory. 12 When two players' actions are strategic complements, each player's set of best responses weakly increases with the actions of the other. In our model, there is strategic complementarity between firm and worker investment: a higher level of firm (worker) investment raises the incentive for any worker (firm) to invest. This is the fundamental logic that underlies our ultimate policy prescription: two-sided investment insurance. Vives (1990) builds on these concepts and analyzes supermodular games, where all players' payoffs satisfy monotonicity properties that are closely related to strategic complementarity. 13 He demonstrates that such games have appealing properties. For example, the equilibrium set is always non-empty and equilibria can be pareto-ranked. Additionally, he describes robust stability properties of these games.
Despite strategic complementarity between worker and firm investment, the game we describe is not supermodular, and the results discussed by Vives (1990) do not apply. One can see this from the following observation. Fixing a level of firm investment δ, there is a set of possible worker investment levels π * (δ) and corresponding employer hiring standards s * that are mutually consistent. In general, raising δ raises some elements of π * (δ) but lowers others: i.e., the correspondence π * (δ) is not increasing.
The Basic Model

A. Building Blocks
Imagine a large number of employers and a larger population of workers. Each employer is randomly matched with many workers from this population. Workers belong to one of two identifiable groups, j ∈ {A, B}. Denote by λ A the fraction of As in the population and λ B = 1 − λ A the fraction of Bs. One can imagine groups being race, gender, or any other protected class.
Nature moves first and assigns a type to each worker and a type to each employer. The worker's type, denoted by c ∈ (0, c), c < ∞, depicts her cost of investment in human capital. Let the fraction of workers with costs no greater than c be represented by G W (c) -a smooth and continuous cumulative distribution function -with g W (c) the associated density. Similarly, employers have the opportunity to invest at a cost k j ∈ 0, k , k < ∞, to make their workplaces desirable and productive places to work for workers of type j. The fraction of employers with investment cost no greater than k j is G E (k j ), with g E (k j ) the associated density. Superscripts "W " and "E" refer to workers and employers, respectively. Lang (1986) , we assume that firm investment costs are fixed. This is done for analytical simplicity and symmetry -and has no impact on our main results. Section 8.3.2 describes how the model 12 In another early paper, Cooper and John (1988) use the concept of strategic complementarity to analyze macroeconomic coordination failures. 13 Supermodular games were originally developed by Topkis (1979) but were first applied to economics by Vives (1990) and further analyzed by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) .
Consistent with
Nature distributes types and costs
Workers and firms invest
Workers and firms matched
Workers and firms observe signals Workers apply, firms make offers Worker and firm payoffs realized After observing their costs, workers (resp. employers) make a dichotomous investment decision, choosing to become "qualified" or "unqualified," with no in-between. For workers, "qualified" implies that they are productive. For firms, "qualified" implies they are establishments that are desirable for a given type of worker. Nature then distributes a signal to employers regarding each worker's investment decision and, simultaneously, a signal to workers regarding the employer's investment decision. Specifically, let θ ∈ [0, 1] denote a noisy, but informative, signal to employers about whether or not a particular worker chose to invest. There is an associated smooth and continuous cumulative distribution function F W i (θ), and density function,
is non-increasing in θ (i.e., f W i (θ) satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property).
The signal structure for employer investment is similar: nature distributes a noisy but informative signal ψ ∈ [0, 1] to workers about whether or not the employer chose to invest. There is an associated smooth and continuous cumulative distribution function, F E i (ψ), and density function,
Next, workers observe the signal they receive from the employer and decide whether to "apply." 14 If they receive information that suggests that a given workplace will be a poor fit for their type, they may refrain from applying. Firms observe θ for all who apply and make a deterministic hiring decision: hire or reject.
Production occurs and payoffs are received.
B. Payoffs
If the worker is hired and works for an employer who has made a group j investment, she receives a fixed payoff of ω q − c if she chose to invest and ω q if not. If the worker is hired and works for an employer who has not made a group j specific investment, she receives −ω u − c if she invested and −ω u if she did not. If she does not work for any employer, she receives −c if she invested or zero otherwise. 15 We assume that both 14 We view this model as a static approach to what is likely a dynamic process. In a dynamic version, a worker's choice to refrain from applying would reflect the option value of waiting for a better offer. 15 A mathematically equivalent assumption (see section 8.2.1) is that the worker receives an unemployment paymentŪ -or other outside option -if she does not apply. In this case, the key assumption is that workers prefer unemployment to being matched to an employer who has not invested. A third alternative is to imagine that application to a firm is costly. ω q and ω u are positive and exogenously determined. This, again, is purely for analytical convenience and ease of exposition in our baseline model and does not change our main results. We endogenize wages in two places: (1) to demonstrate robustness of our approach, we discuss policy when workers are paid either by ex-post bargaining or by their expected marginal product in section 8.3.1; and (2) we allow for continuous wage-setting when discussing our proposed empirical test for statistical discrimination in section 6.
The employer receives χ q −k j , χ q > 0, if it hires a qualified worker and makes group j-specific investments, and χ q if it hires a qualified worker and chooses not to invest in group j amenities. Similarly, the employer's payoffs are −χ u − k j where −χ u < 0 if it hires an unqualified worker and makes group j-specific investment, and −χ u if it hires an unqualified worker and chooses not to invest in group j-specific amenities. If no worker is hired, the employer receives −k j if it invested and zero otherwise.
C. Strategies
The worker's strategy consists of a pair of functions -an investment decision and an application decision, which we write as
employer's strategy also consists of a pair of functions -an investment decision and an assignment decision
D. Expected Payoffs
Employer Offer Threshold
Let π j ∈ [0, 1] denote the employer's prior belief that a randomly drawn worker of group j is qualified.
The expected payoff for the employer is a function of its beliefs, investment decisions, the signal it receives, and net payoffs. An employer does not intrinsically care about which type of worker it hires -save investment costs, which are sunk at the time that it makes an offer -but it may have different priors about the likelihoods that workers of different types are qualified.
Given the prior π j and observed signal θ, the employer formulates the posterior probability, using Bayes' rule, that a worker of group j is qualified:
The expected payoff to hiring a worker of group j can be written as: κ (π j , θ) χ q − (1 − κ (π j , θ)) χ u . Recall that the payoff for not hiring a worker is 0. The condition that this expected payoff be positive defines a standard, which is a critical threshold in the signal θ such that the employer will choose to hire only if a worker's signal exceeds this
Worker Application Threshold
Let δ j ∈ [0, 1] denote the prior belief that a worker of type j ∈ {A, B} has that an employer made the investment relevant to her group. The worker's expected payoff is a function of her beliefs, investment decision, the signal she receives, and net payoffs. Given δ j and observed signal ψ, workers calculate the posterior probability that a particular employer has invested, again using Bayes' rule:
. The worker's expected payoff of applying can be written as: ξ (δ j , ψ) ω q − (1 − ξ (δ j , ψ)) ω u . Thus, similar to before, the worker will only apply if the employer's signal exceeds the following threshold:
Investment Decisions
We begin with the worker. With probability δ j 1 − F E q (t * (δ j )) a group j worker will be matched to an employer who made the group j investment and will apply to that employer because the signal she receives exceeds her application threshold. However, with probability (1 − δ j ) 1 − F E u (t * (δ j )) she will apply to an employer who did not invest. In total, the worker's expected payoff from successfully obtaining a job is
) ω u . Investing in human capital increases the likelihood that a worker is accepted by an employer. If a worker of type j invests, she gets expected gross payoff:
. Thus, the net return on investment for workers can be written as:
Now, consider the employer's investment decision. Similar to the worker, the employer's expected net payoff from hiring a worker is
If the employer makes the group j investment, it gets gross payoff λ j [1 − F E q (t j )]χ (π j ). If the employer does not invest, it gets λ j [1 − F E u (t j )]χ (π j ). Recall that λ j is the fraction of workers who are members of group j. Thus, the net return to investment for firms is:
E. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
A pair of beliefs -one for employers and one for workers -will be self-confirming if, by choosing standards optimal for those beliefs, the actions of each group of agents induce the other to become qualified at exactly the rate posited by the initial beliefs. This intuition leads to the following definition of equilibrium:
Definition. An equilibrium of the game is a pair of beliefs {π, δ} satisfying:
This definition of equilibrium implies that both employer and worker beliefs are confirmed in equilibrium vis-à-vis a self-confirming feedback loop. Fix δ, and suppose that an employer believes that a fraction π of workers are qualified. Expecting this, each worker calculates her net benefit of investment and invests if and only if her costs are less than the net benefit. In equilibrium, the fraction of workers who invest must be equal to the employer's beliefs π. Workers' beliefs about firms must also be self-confirming.
For any fixed δ, our model nests the seminal Coate and Loury (1993) model where the wage is ω(δ).
Similarly, fixing π at some level induces a version of Coate and Loury (1993) in which roles are reversed:
workers' pessimistic beliefs drive disparate outcomes. In summary, discrimination can be generated by either side in the two-sided model and, more importantly, is generically sustained by both.
Beliefs in this model exhibit extensive complementarity. First, a belief that one side is more likely to invest increases the expected return to investment of the other side, since it strictly increases the likelihood (π or δ) of getting a positive payoff from a given match. The signal threshold, s * (π) or t * (δ), used by the opposing side is also lowered. For example, a rise in the fraction of firms investing causes t * (δ) to fall as workers become more optimistic and more willing to apply for jobs. Conversely, a rise in π causes s * (π) to fall as firms become more optimistic about workers and more willing to hire.
In our baseline model with fixed investment costs, there is an inherent disadvantage to being a numerical minority. If λ A = λ B then the set of equilibria are fully symmetric. However, if λ A > λ B then, for any given beliefs, firms have a strictly lower incentive to invest in amenities for Bs. At the extreme, as λ B → 0, no firms will ever be motivated to accommodate Bs. This intuition is straightforward to see from equation (2).
For any fixed π and t, λ scales the return, while investment costs are independent of population size. 16 A discriminatory equilibrium is one in which employers do not have homogeneous beliefs (e.g., π A > π B ).
This can occur whenever the system defined by (3) and (4) has multiple solutions, for then both workers and employers understand that workers of group A are more qualified than workers of group B and employers are less likely to make the workplace suitable for Bs than they are for As. One can imagine the familiar refrain:
employers would be delighted to hire Bs but they are just not qualified. And Bs retort that they would invest if only employers were not biased. Discrimination, in this sense, is a classic coordination problem.
To understand the mechanics of equilibrium, it is instructive to consider fixing the level of firm investment at someδ. This fixes the worker application threshold at t * (δ) and induces a model that is isomorphic to 16 In section 8.3.2, we present an extension in which costs are incurred only for workers of group j who apply and are hired.
Coate and Loury (1993) with worker wage ω(δ). This is shown in Figure 2a . Holding fixed the level of firm investment, equilibrium is characterized by two graphs in {π, s} space: an EE curve, which embodies the employer's hiring threshold; and a W W curve, which describes optimal worker investment as a function of that hiring threshold. The EE curve is downward sloping, since more optimistic firms set more generous (lower) thresholds. The W W curve is hump-shaped, reflecting the fact that there is little incentive for workers to invest if employers set very high or very low standards. An entirely analogous thought exercise can be conducted for any fixed π, which induces a similar onesided model in which employers invest and workers decide whether to apply. Varying π allows us to trace out the solutions to equation (4) as shown by δ * (π) in Figure 2b .
Just as in
A "zero investment equilibrium" always exists in the two-sided model, since π = δ = 0 and s = t = 1 always satisfy the equilibrium equations. Yet, other equilibria may also exist. This should not be surprising given the strategic complementarity between workers and firms that we have described. For example, there are exactly three equilibria for the parameterization shown in Figure 2b : Z, U and S. The model generally has multiple solutions if workers and employers are responsive enough to each others' investments.
Proposition 1. Let π * (δ) and δ * (π) be the sets of solutions to equations (3) and (4) respectively. Assume that φ (θ) and τ (ψ) are continuous, strictly decreasing and strictly positive on [0, 1], and that G W (c) and G E (k) are continuous with full support on [0, c] and 0, k with G W (0) = G E (0) = 0. Further assume that for some δ, there exists an s for which
Similarly assume that for some π, there exists a t for which
. Then non-zero elements of π * (δ) and δ * (π) exist for any δ ≥ δ and π ≥ π respectively. If there is a set of beliefs {π, δ} such that δ ∈ δ * (π) and π < max {π * (δ)} then there exist multiple solutions to the two-sided model.
All technical proofs are presented in Section 8.1. To better understand the logic behind Proposition 1, see Figure 2b . First, we know that the assumptions about φ (θ) and τ (ψ) guarantee that the solutions to each equation are bounded below one. Second, we assume that there exists some pair of beliefs {π, δ} such that δ ∈ δ * (π) and π < max {π * (δ)}, a condition that must hold for large enough χ q and ω q . Combined with our regularity assumptions, this is enough to ensure that π * (δ) and δ * (π) intersect at multiple points with δ > 0 and π > 0, which define equilibria with non-zero investment. This is the case in Figure 2b . To analyze dynamics, we define a simple backward-looking learning process that describes how employers and workers adjust their beliefs and actions in response to a shock.
This rule is backward-looking, with each generation of workers and firms choosing their actions based on the decisions of the preceding generation. 17 We can use this learning process to analyze the robustness of equilibria to small errors of perception.
Following Coate and Loury (1993), we consider an arbitrary but small perturbation to both firm and worker investments. Under the adjustment process above and the assumptions of our existence proposition, the zero investment equilibrium is always locally stable. To see this, observe that below some strictly positive δ, no worker applies because workers are too pessimistic about firm investment. Similarly, low enough π guarantees that no firms make offers. As long as δ and π remain below these critical values, there is no incentive for either party to invest.
To analyze stability more generally, we approximate this two-dimensional system of non-linear equations as a first-order linearized system of difference equations.
For ease of exposition, define the following derivatives.
Intuitively, W W 1 is the slope of the W W curve in Figure 2a and captures the impact of a less favorable (higher) firm signal threshold on worker incentives. Similarly, EE 1 is the slope of the EE curve and captures the effect of lower worker investment on the signal threshold that firms optimally set. The direct impact of higher firm investment on the worker's payoff from being hired is RR 1 and could be shown by an upward shift in the WW curve. The firm equivalents -W W 2 , EE 2 and RR 2 -are analogous.
These definitions allow us to write the Jacobian of the system compactly.
The linearized system is locally asymptotically stable if both eigenvalues of this matrix have absolute values strictly less than one. The following condition is necessary and sufficient for this (Neusser 2016) .
Since both eigenvalues strictly less than one guarantees that an equilibrium is hyperbolic, this is also sufficient for the non-linear system to be asymptotically stable.
To understand the stability condition, consider two special cases. First, suppose that worker and firm signal thresholds are locally unresponsive to changes in investment: i.e., the two thresholds s * and t * are approximately fixed. In the limit, this implies that 1/EE 1 → 0 and 1/EE 2 → 0, which causes the condition for stability to collapse to: −1 < RR 1 · RR 2 < 1. This condition is intuitive. If worker and firm payoffs ω and χ change too sharply with each others' investments, then a small perturbation causes a reinforcing dynamic through beliefs, which moves the system further away from the original equilibrium.
It is also instructive to consider another extreme in which worker investment responds very strongly to the firm signal threshold s * , which in turn is highly responsive to worker investment. This implies that |W W /EE | > 1, violating the first inequality of the stability condition. Instability arises in this case because a small perturbation to worker investment is compounded through changes in firms' hiring thresholds.
An Example with Uniform Cost and Signal Distributions
To further fix ideas, we now introduce a simple example to provide intuition for the model. Let costs for workers and firms be distributed uniformly on [0, 1] so that G W (c) = c and G E (k) = k.
Worker signals are also uniformly distributed, but with the support depending on the investment deci- 
. We make analogous assumptions for firms. The signal sent by a firm that invested is uniformly distributed
Thus, a firm certainly invested if ψ > ψ u , certainly did not invest if ψ < ψ q , and there is a constant likelihood
The employer will always reject workers with clear fail signals and always accept those with clear pass signals. However, employers will make an offer to unclear workers if and only if they are "optimistic" enough in the sense that their prior π j is greater than a fixed thresholdπ j . In symbols:
Thus, the employer will set the hiring threshold at either s * = θ q or s * = θ u . Similarly, workers will always apply to firms with clear pass signals, never to firms with clear fail signals, and will apply to firms with unclear signals if and only if they are optimistic enough about firms: δ j ≥δ j . The worker will therefore set the threshold at either t * = ψ q or t * = ψ u .
To make this example especially simple, we adopt parameter values that make firms and workers sym-
, χ u = 2 and λ = 0.5. With these functional form assumptions and parameter values, the returns to investment for workers (β W ) and employers (β E ) are piecewise-linear functions. 18 The fraction of workers who invest is π = min {max {G W , 0} , 1} and the fraction of firms who invest is
The equilibria in this example are shown in Figure 3 , which is the equivalent of Figure 2b for this example.
For any fixed belief π about the fraction of workers who are investing, the solid line, δ * (π), shows the fraction of firms who optimally invest. Similarly, the dotted line, π * (δ), shows the fraction of workers who invest for a given belief δ about the fraction of firms who are investing. There are three equilibria, shown as S, U and Z. Only at these points are the actions and beliefs of firms and workers mutually consistent. Figure 3 are the effects of changing signal thresholds. As firms become more optimistic (higher π), there are two effects. First, favorable beliefs about workers directly raise the return to firm investment, since the expected payoff from a match is higher. Secondly, firms eventually become so optimistic that they accept workers with 'unclear' test scores. At this point, firm returns become more sensitive to worker investment, since a match is more likely when workers are given the benefit of the doubt. This is reflected in a change in the slope of δ * (π). The explanation of the shape of π * (δ) is analogous.
Also evident in
This example also permits a transparent discussion of dynamics, since it corresponds to the special case in which signal thresholds are locally unresponsive to beliefs (see Section 2). The phase arrows in Figure 3 show the direction of adjustment in any given region. With the assumptions of this example, an equilibrium is stable if and only if the solid line is flatter than the dotted line: i.e., only the two extreme equilibria, S and Z, are stable. To understand the instability of the equilibrium at U , imagine a small upward perturbation to both π and δ such that the economy is at a point above the dotted line and below the solid line. From here, the fraction of firms and workers investing both increase further, moving us further away from U .
Both Proposition 1 and this simple example demonstrate that multiple equilibria can occur in our model.
In the next two sections, we explore policies that can help minimize the set of "bad" equilibria (i.e. those with low investment and pessimistic beliefs).
Extending the Basic Model: One-Sided Policies
We now consider how the government or another third party intermediary might intervene with some policy to break equilibria that disadvantage some groups relative to others. We are particularly interested in a policy that: (i) eliminates equilibria without homogeneous beliefs; (ii) never harms its recipients; and (iii) achieves equality as quickly as possible. Given its historical and current prominence across the world -and the controversy that typically ensues -we begin with affirmative action.
Affirmative Action -Executive Order # 11246, signed by Lyndon B. Johnson -has been promulgated around the world from Malaysia to South Africa to Lebanon. Affirmative action policies generally entail the preferential treatment of persons who possess certain social traits based on a presumption that, on average, individuals of those traits are less effective in the competition for scarce resources because of some social or historical handicap.
The simplest affirmative action policy insists that employers make color-blind assignment -requiring that As and Bs with identical "signals" be treated equally. Unfortunately, this policy can only be enforced if -in every instance -a regulator can observe and verify all information upon which employers rely when making hiring decisions. We assume this type of extreme informational requirement -essentially requiring government regulators to sit in all interviews -is impractical. Instead, we explore two potential definitions of affirmative action -equality in offers and equality in employment. We begin with the former.
A. Equality in Offers
In statistical discrimination models without strategic complementarity between worker and firm investment, affirmative action can be quite successful. In fact, affirmative action rules out the existence of any equilibrium with zero investment by workers of one group but positive investment by members of the other.
Furthermore, firms can satisfy the affirmative action requirement by setting s A = s B , which achieves full equality in investment rates and correspondingly homogeneous beliefs: i.e., π A = π B . Yet, as Coate and Loury (1993) make clear, affirmative action may not lead to homogeneous beliefs if more generous hiring standards undermine investment and become demotivating. As we will show, affirmative action is even less effective in a model with strategic complementarity.
The behavior of workers is not directly affected by affirmative action. They continue to make their decisions as before, depending on the assignment standards and investment decisions of firms. Affirmative action changes an employer's problem, however, because standards and investments can no longer be chosen independently for the two groups.
Consider a group of workers about which an employer believes a fraction π are qualified and for which it
be the probability that the employer assigns to making an offer to a randomly drawn worker, and let P (s j , π j , i j ) denote the expected payoff from hiring such a worker, where i j ∈ {q, u} captures the firm investment decision.
In symbols:
In the modified game, each employer must ensure that, whatever standards it uses, anticipated hiring rates for each group are equal: i.e., ρ (s A , π A ) = ρ (s B , π B ). Given beliefs (π A , π B ) and worker application standards (t A , t B ), it will choose hiring standards (s A , s B ) and make an investment decision i j ∈ {q, u} for each group j ∈ {A, B} to solve the following optimization problem:
Namely, an employer's best response under affirmative action regulations is to choose standards and make investment decisions that maximize its expected payoff, subject to the affirmative action constraint. This suggests the following definition of equilibrium under affirmative action.
Definition. An equilibrium under affirmative action is a set of beliefs (π A , π B ), (δ A , δ B ), worker standards (t A , t B ) and employer standards (s A , s B ) satisfying the following conditions:
The only requirement that affirmative action adds is the constraint that ρ (s B , π B ) = ρ (s A , π A ). Without this requirement, we obtain the unconstrained version of (6), which is solved by s A = s * (π A ), s B = s * (π B ) and firm investment rate δ j = G E (β E (t j , π j |λ j )). It is also clear that if an equilibrium with homogeneous beliefs exists without affirmative action, then an equilibrium with the same beliefs exists with the constraint.
This follows directly from the fact that the affirmative action constraint is non-binding in any equilibrium in which employers have homogeneous beliefs (π A = π B ).
However, unlike Coate and Loury (1993) , it is generally impossible to guarantee that homogeneous beliefs will prevail. There are at least two additional reasons for this. First, an equilibrium with zero B investment but positive A investment always satisfies the affirmative action constraint. We formalize this result in Proposition 2, but the intuition is simple: if Bs do not apply, firms are not punished for not hiring.
Proposition 2. Assume that, without affirmative action, there exists an equilibrium with positive investment.
Then there exists an equilibrium under affirmative action without homogeneous beliefs.
A second problem is that there is generally no equilibrium with positive investment and homogeneous employer beliefs unless unless λ A = λ B . The reason for this is that firm investment returns are lower for smaller groups. More formally, suppose that π A = π B = π. The affirmative action constraint is then satisfied with equal firm hiring standards s A = s B = s * (π). Worker beliefs cannot be homogeneous in this case since firm investment incentives are strictly lower for the minority, for any given firm beliefs π. However, strictly lower firm investment rates for Bs (δ B < δ A ) combined with equal hiring thresholds must lead to lower investment returns for B workers (π B < π A ). This is a contradiction and leads to the following result. Further assume that λ A = λ B and that G E (k) and G W (c) are strictly increasing. Then no equilibrium with positive investment and homogeneous employer beliefs exists (with or without affirmative action).
A final drawback of this type of affirmative action in our model is that it can make outcomes for B workers strictly worse than under the status quo. Following the intuitive learning process we described in Section 3, suppose that employer and worker beliefs are fixed in the short run. At these fixed beliefs, the imposition of an affirmative action constraint can cause firm investment returns for Bs to become negative, ensuring that no firm invests and thus no B workers apply. This triggers reversion to zero investment by firms, and ultimately also workers (δ B = π B = 0). We formalize this result in Proposition 4. The intuition here is simple. Without affirmative action, firms were already hiring the few minority workers who they expected to be qualified. Affirmative action forces them to hire a potentially large number of additional minority workers if they apply, and these additional workers generate a loss for the firm on average. As a result, the few employers who were making investments to attract additional workers have less incentive to do so. If this effect is strong enough, the requirement may hurt its intended beneficiaries by undermining any existing efforts by employers to attract minorities.
The mechanisms behind the failure of affirmative action here are different from Coate and Loury (1993) .
In Coate and Loury (1993) , affirmative action eliminates equilibria with zero investment by one group but not the other, and equilibria with homogeneous beliefs always exist. The problem that arises is that homogeneous beliefs may not obtain if the parameters allow more generous employer hiring standards to be sufficiently de-motivating. Instead, there may be a solution to the one-sided equivalent of problem (6) that features lower standards but also lower investment by the minority group. Since our model nests Coate and Loury (1993) , this is also a concern here. However, affirmative action in the two-sided model is additionally complicated by worker belief formation and application behavior, as well as the inherent disadvantage that minorities face because employers have less incentive to adapt their workplaces to accommodate smaller groups. 20
B. Equality in Employment
We now consider employment quotas, which require that members of groups A and B are hired in proportion to their population sizes. 21 This articulation of affirmative action may be closer to the original spirit of early affirmative action (Revised Philadelphia Plan 1969). Under this type of constraint, employers cannot use the excuse that they would like to hire minorities but are not receiving applications. However, employment quotas can trigger a severe version of patronization in which aggressive hiring by employers undermines minority workers' incentive to invest.
be the probability the employer assigns to hiring a randomly drawn group j worker, where i j ∈ {q, u}. The employment quota requires that ρ H (s A , π A , i A ) = ρ H (s B , π B , i B ). Thus, given beliefs (π A , π B ) and worker application standards (t A , t B ), an employer will again choose hiring standards (s A , s B ) and make investment decisions (i A , i B ) to solve the following problem:
Note that this is identical to problem (6) except that ρ (s j , π j ) has been replaced with ρ H (s j , π j , i j ).
In the case of employment quotas, employers may set different standards depending on which investments they made, since the investments affect the ability of an employer to attract workers. We therefore use s i A ,i B j to denote the hiring threshold set for group j by a firm that made investment decisions i A and i B . Firms' investment decisions will now also be related across groups, with the critical cost threshold for a firm to 20 Our result that members of smaller minorities are worse off aligns with the predictions of search models (e.g., Black, 1995) , although Becker's analysis of taste-based discrimination with perfect sorting of workers across firms predicts the opposite. 21 We are grateful to Lawrence Katz for suggesting this exercise.
invest in one group (k * j ) depending on its cost of investment for the other groups (k −j ). As a result, the return expected by a worker, which we denote by β W , will be a more complicated function of firm costs and all four hiring thresholds for her group. This suggests the following definition of equilibrium under an employment quota.
Definition. An equilibrium under an employment quota is a set of beliefs (π A , π B ), (δ A , δ B ), worker standards (t A , t B ) and employer standards s q,q j , s q,u j , s u,q j , s u,u j , j ∈ {A, B} satisfying the following conditions:
(a) Each firm's investment decisions (i A , i B ) and thresholds (s A , s B ) solve (7), given 
This is essentially the same sufficient condition as that provided by Coate and Loury (1993) for affirmative action to guarantee homogeneous beliefs in a one-sided model. Fixing employer investment decisions, the inequality in Propositon 5 guarantees that no two levels of worker investment are consistent with the same probability of being hired. It is always satisfied if φ (0) = f W u (0) /f W q (0) is small enough, which implies that the employer signal of worker productivity is relatively uninformative. Next, near-perfect observability of employer investment ensures that firms will not be able to satisfy the employment quota unless they make both or neither of the investments. Thus, δ A ≈ δ B . Combined, these two assumptions ensure that an employment quota eliminates any possibility of discrimination in equilibrium.
The result above is subject to an important caveat: even if homogeneous beliefs are achieved, this need not improve the outcomes of any individual. The policy may harm the majority rather than helping the minority, and can worsen outcomes for both groups. This is easiest to see from an extreme example in which π B = δ B = 0 initially, implying that no minority workers apply. Holding beliefs fixed, the only way for a firm to satisfy an employment quota is to hire zero workers of type A. This is in stark contrast to Coate and Loury (1993) , where firms can satisfy the quota by simply lowering the minority hiring standard.
This intuition applies more generally and arises because employers are constrained in their ability to attract minority workers who are pessimistic about firms. Additionally, the employment quota can lead employers to be overly generous in their hiring standards, severely undermining worker investment. We formalize these intuitions in the following result. 
C. Wage and Employment Subsidies
Another policy proposal put forward in the literature is to subsidize worker wages or employment. Not only do these policies fail to eliminate zero investment as an equilibrium, but both can actually be harmful in the two-sided model. To see why, suppose a wage subsidy s is introduced, raising a worker's positive and negative payoffs to s + ω q and s − ω u respectively. A worker will now apply if and only if:
This subsidy lowers the worker's application threshold, which can undermine firms' incentive to invest. While this intuition is general, it can again be seen most clearly from the extreme: if s ≥ ω u , the worker will always apply and zero firms will invest. Depending on the subsidy chosen, this policy therefore has the potential to harm its intended beneficiaries. The basic intuition is that the effect of a wage subsidy on worker application behavior can reduce the impact of firm investment on the number of workers that it attracts, lowering firms' return on investment. A precisely analogous problem occurs if an employment subsidy is provided to firms, which raises both χ q and χ u . 22
D. An "Impossibility" Result
Given the failure of the specific policies we have considered thus far, we now search more systematically for a simple and reliable way to rule out equilibria with zero investment, and to quickly eliminate discrimination without potential for unintended harm. Since there are two decisions for workers and two for employers, we ask -abstractly at first -which of these margins one should target with policy. The answer is surprisingly definitive: an ideal policy simultaneously targets the investment decisions of both workers and firms.
Proposition 7. Suppose that we seek to move to an equilibrium {s * , t * , π * , δ * } from another point with s 0 > s * , t 0 > t * , π 0 < π * by independently setting some combination C of s, t, π and δ. There exist interventions that achieve this aim for any {π 0 , δ 0 } if and only if {δ, π} ∈ C, {t, π} ∈ C or {s, δ} ∈ C.
Targeting {δ, π} is faster than any alternative.
An immediate implication of Proposition 7 is that policies that only affect one decision margin will fail to achieve the goals we have set forth. This includes not just affirmative action but also many policies that we have not considered explicitly. The result also provides some guidance for where to look for policy solution, which is a problem we take up in Section 5.
Suggestive Evidence of the Efficacy of Two-Sided Interventions
There is suggestive empirical evidence that two-sided policies are more effective than their one-sided equivalents. We focus on job training programs, of which Job Corps is a canonical example. It is a residential program funded by the Department of Labor but operated mostly by private contractors, and typically lasts around eight months. Participants receive vocational and academic training, counseling, social skills training, health education and job search assistance. There is some limited input from business to incorporate specific proficiencies but little involvement of employers. A large-scale randomized evaluation suggested that Job Corps increased earnings by around four percent, one year after the program, but with little long term impact and no effect on hourly wages ( The success of these programs stands in stark contrast to the average job training program. This result aligns with the predictions of our model, although the result could be explained by a litany of other potential differences between the programs. A trainee who participates WorkAdvance has an incentive to invest and gain the skills being offered. Not only does this investment lead to being hired, but the worker knows she will be rewarded with a position with an employer who is offering a real opportunity. At the same time, employers can trust that they will receive workers who have both the cognitive and non-cognitive skills that they need to be productive. While we cannot prove definitively that these are the reasons why these programs succeed, there does seem to be a pattern in which programs are most successful (Hossain and Bloom, 2015) .
The promising results of programs like these could be why federally-mandated programs are becoming more targeted and have begun to combine work requirements with comprehensive employer-driven training and support services. 23 The Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 shifted the emphasis of these programs toward private industry, and the focus on employer involvement was consolidated further under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (JTPA 1994; WIA 2000) . The wording of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014 is even explicitly two-sided, with stated aims of increasing employment, retention, and earnings of participants while meeting the skill requirements of employers (WIOA 2016).
Extending the Basic Model: Two-Sided Policies
Building on the impossibility result we presented in Proposition 7, the next section formally considers interventions that target both sides of the coordination problem faced by workers and firms in our model.
A. Two-Sided Investment Insurance
We begin with a new policy: two-sided investment insurance. Specifically, we suppose that the government has access to informative (but possibly imperfect) signals of worker and firm investment, and that it offers incentive payments conditional on these signals. This solution is very effective in our model. We also believe some approximation is likely to be implementable in reality, given policymakers have access to increasingly rich administrative data that could be used to measure both worker qualification and firm investment.
Proposition 8. Suppose that the government observes noisy but informative signals, θ g and ψ g , of worker and firm investment respectively. For any initial beliefs, there exist incentive payments ω g and χ g conditional on these signals that immediately ensure that π A = π B , δ A = δ B , s A = s B and t A = t B . If and only if λ A = λ B , a non-zero permanent investment subsidy is required to maintain π A = π B .
An especially attractive version of the worker subsidy is feasible if the government observes the same signal as firms: i.e., θ g = θ. In this case, it can set s g = s A and condition the worker payment on rejection by a firm. The advantage of this policy is that no worker payments are made by the government, rendering the worker intervention costless. Intuitively, for a worker to receive a government payment, she would have 23 An earlier example of the success of this type of highly integrated job training program is the Center of Employment Training in San Jose, California (Cave et al. 1993 ).
to be rejected by an employer and then be "hired" by the government. But this is impossible if the employer and government signals and signal thresholds are identical. Essentially, a non-discriminatory government's use of its "market power" in standard setting achieves equality by "insuring" workers against the possibility that employers are discriminatory.
If θ g is a noisy approximation of θ, the intuition is similar. In this case, we can characterize investment incentives using the conditional distribution of the government signal θ g . The probability of rejection by the government isF W i (s g B |θ < s B ). If the government sets s g B = s A , the fraction of B workers who invest is:
Just like the policy described in Proposition 8, there is an incentive payment that ensures that π B,t = π A for any π A . Since this is achieved immediately, the actual cost of the worker payments are as follows.
This expected cost clearly shrinks to zero if the government signal is approximately identical to that of the firm. A small amount of additional noise adds to the cost.
In summary, two-sided investment insurance achieves all of our stated goals. It eliminates equilibria with discriminatory beliefs weakly faster than any other policy, with no potential for negative side effects.
Year Up -an organization that offers disadvantaged youth a combination of skills training and a six month internship with corporate partners such as JPMorgan, State Street or Google -is an example of two-sided investment insurance. 24 Unlike a traditional job training program, Year Up training is narrowly targeted to an industry or even a specific employer. Employers are actively involved in its operation; for instance, they may design case studies and conduct mock interviews or customer interactions. Upon completing the program satisfactorily, participants are then rewarded with a well-paid internship with genuine opportunities for career advancement and ongoing support from Year Up. It is worth highlighting that a key difference between Year Up and other training programs is that they also train employers on how to best deal with minority youth (e.g. require firm investment) and guarantee an internship for every student. If a student does not obtain an internship at the end of their six month training period, Year Up will hire them.
This model has been remarkably successful, with a randomized evaluation indicating that treated individuals had 30 percent higher earnings over two years, mostly driven by higher wages (Roder and Elliot 2014 ). 24 For more information, see www.yearup.org
B. Affirmative Action
Proposition 7 suggests that an alternative policy is to simultaneously target both the investment and hiring decisions of firms. One way to implement this is to combine affirmative action on the 'extensive' and 'intensive' margins. Essentially, firms would be encouraged to invest in amenities for the minority group However, a larger gap between groups limits the effectiveness of a one-sided investment subsidy. Even if combined with affirmative action, it may be impossible to achieve equality in finite time. There are two reasons for this. First, to be successful, the subsidy needs to raise firm investment in the B amenity to above the rate of investment in the A amenity. There is little scope to do this if nearly all firms are already making the A investment. Second, a harsh hiring standard for B workers limits the impact on worker returns of higher firm investment rates. These concerns imply that "two-sided affirmative action" is unlikely to be a policy that could eliminate severe inequalities.
Proposition 9. Assume that φ (θ) and τ (ψ) are continuous, strictly decreasing and strictly positive on [0, 1]. For any π B ∈ [0, 1) and π A ∈ (0, 1) with π B < π A , there exist cost distributions G W and G E , a signal distribution F W i (θ) and parameters such that: (i) π B and π A are part of an equilibrium; and (ii) no one-sided investment subsidy can raise π B to π A in any finite number of periods T , even if combined with affirmative action.
Interpreting Group Differences in the Presence of Two-Sided
Statistical Discrimination
Two-sided statistical discrimination complicates empirical analysis, since differences between groups are generically a combination of both employer and worker decision-making. For example, consider a setting with employer learning as in Altonji and Pierret (2001) . Under conditions they outline, the conditional expectation for log-wages can be written as a time-varying function of the form:
where: s i is observable to both the employer and the econometrician; z i is observable to econometrician but not observed (or at least not used) by the employer; t denotes experience; and H (t) is an experience profile of productivity that is assumed not to depend on s i and z i . Altonji and Pierret (2001) show that, if their assumptions hold, b s,t falls with experience, while b z,t rises.
Their empirical results show that the racial wage gap rises with experience, which suggests that race is a z variable -i.e., it is not initially used by the employer. This would imply that employers do not fully incorporate racial differences in productivity into their initial wage offer. The conclusion of their analysis is that statistical discrimination cannot explain racial differences in wage profiles.
The assumption that the experience profile of productivity is independent of race is restrictive. Altonji and Pierret (2001) acknowledge this and test for racial differences in training opportunities. Any such differences could arise as the result of employer discrimination but our model suggests that they could also be driven by worker expectations. For example, suppose that a worker has the opportunity each period to make a costly investment in firm-specific human capital. The return on such investments depends on whether higher productivity will be rewarded by the employer.
Early in a worker's career, the forces in our model would predict that black workers -if pessimisticwould invest less. In turn, this would cause the racial wage gap to widen with experience in these early years, an effect that would be sharpened by the fact that black workers often have disproportionately short tenure.
However, sufficient information about a specific employer should eventually overwhelm any racial difference in priors so that black workers at "good" firms invest at higher rates. If investment returns are diminishing, we would expect to see convergence between the wages of black and white workers at these firms, but only after many years of tenure. This aligns with the results found by Fryer, Pager and Spenkuch (2013), who demonstrate that racial wage gaps widen with experience but narrow for workers with many years of tenure within the same firm.
An implication of this or any other model in which investments depend on beliefs or otherwise depend
on race is that empirical analysis designed to detect statistical discrimination may be misleading. Assuming that race is an s variable -i.e., employers statistically discriminate -the linear predictor of the wage must be modified as follows:
where ρ s,t captures the racial difference in the slope of the experience profile of productivity. If black workers initially under-invest due to their own pessimism, the resulting rise in ρ s,t could overwhelm the fall in b s,t that Altonji and Pierret (2001) predict, leading to the false conclusion that employers do not discriminate.
A similar argument could be used to explain the same facts with learning-based investment by employers, implying that the two types of discrimination cannot be separated using this approach.
Lang and Lehmann (2012) discuss an alternative test that is robust to differing wage profiles of black and white workers. Let B i be a dummy for whether a worker is black. As before, z i is correlated with productivity and initially unobserved by the employer. Lang and Lehmann propose comparing two regressions.
Since employers gradually learn about z i , we would expect that low ability workers would initially be overpaid but that their wages would converge to their productivity over time. If black workers are lower productivity on average and employers statistically discriminate, we would therefore expect γ 4 < 0 and γ 2 > 0 in the following auxillary regression.
If the weight on z i increases over time as would be predicted by employer learning (β 6 > 0), this implies that α 2 < β 2 and α 4 > β 4 . This is precisely what Altonji and Pierret find using the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) as z i . As Lang and Lehmann (2012) argue, these results are therefore suggestive of a model in which black-white productivity differences widen over time and employers statistically discriminate.
A. Detecting Employer Discrimination
Despite the caveats above, one can make progress identifying employer discrimination, even in the presence of complementarity. The approach we suggest is to focus directly on the mechanism through which statistical discrimination affects incentives: due to pessimistic employer beliefs, workers from a minority group may not be rewarded for improving their productivity. Specifically, we propose a test of whether there is a racial difference in the degree to which imperfect information lowers the return to individual productivity.
Consider the following highly stylized thought experiment. Statistical discrimination should imply that a group j worker who is 10 percent more productive would be paid β j ≤ 10 percent more because employers shrink their estimates of productivity toward the mean of the group. If β W > β B then investment is undermined for blacks relative to whites. The statistical discrimination literature suggests two reasons why we might expect this to be true.
1. Productivity may be harder to assess for minority workers.
Lower investment returns should be expected to compress the productivity distribution for blacks. This
implies that priors -if approximately correct -are tighter and that lower returns are self-fulfilling.
Although the latter effect is what we focus on in our model, we do not attempt to provide a way of empirically distinguishing the competing reasons for statistical discrimination.
For the purpose of empirical analysis, we generalize our model by assuming that workers are paid their marginal product and that investment decisions are continuous. First, we assume that output is produced at constant returns to scale using a mass of quality-adjusted labor Q j and group-specific 'capital' K j provided by the firm. Each worker provides a unit of physical labor but individuals are heterogenous in their ability a i . Effective labor is Q j = L j · a j where L j is the aggregate amount of physical labor supplied by group j workers and a j is the average productivity of those workers.
For convenience we adopt a Cobb-Douglas specification for production:
Letting k j = K j /a j L j be the amount of group-specific capital provided by the firm per unit of effective labor, the marginal product of a worker with ability a i is M P i = a i · γk 1−γ j . In line with our model, we allow for the possibility that a given firm provides different levels of k j for members of each of the two groups j ∈ {B, W }.
For tractability, assume that the employer's prior on worker ability is distributed log-normally: ln a i ∼ N µ a,j , σ 2 a,j . Firms receive a noisy but unbiased signal θ i about each worker's ability. Specifically, ln θ i = ln a i + ln ε i where ln ε i ∼ N 0, σ 2 ε,j . If workers are paid their marginal product, the wage paid by a firm to a worker with ability a i at a firm with k F j can be shown to be as follows.
At this point, we temporarily adopt a strong assumption about employer learning, which we will subsequently relax. We do this purely for pedagogical purposes.
Assumption. For a worker of long enough tenure at her previous employer, her past wage exactly reflects her ability at a new firm.
There are two reasons why this assumption is restrictive. First, we are assuming that learning is complete once a worker achieves long enough tenure. Secondly, we are assuming that a worker's ability a new firm is equivalent to her ability at her old firm. These assumptions may be reasonable in some contexts, but it is easy to imagine violations.
Nonetheless, this assumption allows us to write the wage offered to worker i as a particularly simple function of her wage at her previous firm, group-specific fixed effects for the source and destination firms, and an error term:
where:
ln ε i and β j is the elasticity of the wage with respect to individual ability:
To assess the impact of statistical discrimination, we propose a test of whether the return to ability is lower for blacks. Since β j is exactly the degree to which statistical discrimination lowers the return to productivity, this amounts to the following statistical test.
With data on past and present wages, and adequate movement between firms, this test is feasible.
We next relax the assumption that past wages fully reflect productivity. First, we allow for the possibility that the previous employer also has imperfect information about a worker's ability. However, we continue to assume that this information is better than the new firm in the sense that σ 2 ε,j,OLD < σ 2 ε,j , because some private learning has occurred over the worker's tenure. Second, we allow for the possibility that ability at the new and old firms are correlated but not equivalent.
Under these alternative assumptions, we argue that our proposed test for statistical discrimination is conservative in the sense that differences in returns to ability are understated. Specifically, it can be shown that the difference in coefficients in (8) is a downward-biased measure of the difference in returns to ability induced by statistical discrimination. and that a worker's past employer has more information than her new employer: σ 2 ε,j ≥ σ 2 ε,j,OLD . Then the difference in coefficients from regression (8) 
It is immediately clear that imperfect correlation between ability at the old and new firms (i.e., 0 < ρ < 1) biasesΓ toward zero. For two reasons, we argue that imperfect learning at the previous firm also causes downward bias. First, statistical discrimination reduces the return to investment, compressing the productivity distribution and leading to a tighter employer prior (σ 2 a,B < σ 2 a,W ). Second, black workers typically have shorter tenure, which provides less opportunity for learning by the old employer: thus, we would expect that
. Both forces push toward a downward-biased estimate of Γ. 25 In this sense, our proposed test is a conservative measure of the disparate impact of statistical discrimination.
Conclusion
Statistical discrimination is a foundational concept in the economic analysis of discrimination. Intuitively, the information problem inherent in such models seems two-sided. Yet, current models do not take this into account. Two-sided belief formation makes the interpretation of any empirical data on group differences more complicated -though not impossible -because for any disparity, differences can be driven by either side of the market: workers or firms; universities or applicants; police or civilians.
More importantly, how to break equilibria with negative beliefs about certain groups in a two-sided model is more complex as there is significant complementarity between the beliefs and actions of workers and firms. Affirmative action, employment quotas, wage subsidies, and unemployment insurance all perform quite poorly relative to traditional statistical discrimination models. Indeed, we demonstrate that any onesided policy fails to reliably ensure homogeneous beliefs.
We posit a new policy -two-sided investment insurance -as a solution to statistical discrimination.
Investment insurance is a method for the government or another entity to guarantee wages for individuals it deems as investors, while rewarding firms for making their workplaces productive for all types. We demonstrate that this policy, or one equivalent to it, weakly dominates any alternative. Year Up is an example of this type of opportunity for urban youth. Similar policies might be envisoned for broader classes of workers. and G E (β E (t, π) |λ) > τ (t) / [ω q /ω u + τ (t)] guarantee that the EE curves and WW curves cross at least once, implying at least two non-zero solutions to each of (3) and (4). Since ω (δ) and χ (π) are increasing, the same is true for any δ > δ and π > π. Assume, then, that δ and π are the lowest values for which these conditions hold. Below δ and π, there is no non-zero solution to (3) and (4) respectively. Observe that the non-zero solutions in π * (δ) are bounded strictly between zero and one. This is because: (i) our assumptions on φ (θ) guarantee that s * (π) = 1 for any π < π; and (ii) there exists a threshold π < 1 above which s * (π) = 0. Both s = 0 and s = 1 imply zero worker investment. Equivalent arguments imply that the non-zero solutions in δ * (π) are bounded strictly between zero and one.
For any value of δ, let π * (δ) = max {π * (δ)}. Similarly define δ * (π) = max {δ * (π)}. Both π * (δ) and δ * (π) are obviously defined on [0, 1]. Both are also increasing in their arguments. To see why, start at π (δ 1 ), at which s = s 1 . Consider increasing δ to δ 2 > δ 1 . For any given s,
increases since ω (δ) is increasing in δ. This means that G ([F u (s 1 ) − F q (s 1 )] ω (δ 2 )) > π (δ 1 ). In other words, the WW curve is above the EE curve at s 1 . Thus, since the EE curve is strictly decreasing and G ([F u (0) − F q (0)] ω (δ 2 )) = 0, there must be at least one solution to the left of s 1 , which implies a value of π (δ 2 ) greater than π (δ 1 ). An analogous argument can be used to show that δ * (π) is increasing in π.
We directly assume that is some {π, δ} such that δ ∈ δ * (π) and π < π * (δ). Combined with the monotonicity of π * (δ) and δ * (π), this implies that there is some π such that π * δ * (π) > π. We also know that π * δ * (1) < 1 since π * (δ) is bounded below 1. There must therefore be aπ such that π * δ * (π) =π.
To see why, suppose that there is not. Then there must be a downward discontinuity in π * δ * (π) − π ≤ 0. This is impossible since π is continuous and π * δ * (π) is positive monotonic. Sinceπ is a non-zero solution and δ = π = 0 always satisfies both (3) and (4), there are multiple solutions to the two-sided problem.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that there exists an equilibrium without affirmative action in which there is positive investment in the A market: π A = π * A > 0 and δ A = δ * A > 0. In the B market, there is always an equilibrium with zero investment: π B = δ B = 0. Now suppose that, under affirmative action, π A = π * A , δ A = δ * A , π B = δ B = 0 and t B = t * B (0) = 1. Then affirmative action is non-binding since, with zero workers applying, an employer's profits are independent of s B . It therefore optimally sets s B = s AA B such that the affirmative action constraint holds.
Regardless of s AA B , π B = δ B = 0 is obviously still an equilibrium, since both firms and workers have zero investment returns.
Proof of Proposition 3. First consider an equilibrium without affirmative action. Suppose that π A = π B = π > 0. Then employers' unique optimal signal threshold is s A = s B = s * (π). Worker beliefs δ cannot be homogeneous since G E (β E (t * (δ) , π) |λ) must be strictly lower for the minority for a given any threshold t.
Combined with s A = s B this is incompatible with π j = G W (β W (s j , δ j )) being the same for both groups. This is a contradiction. Finally, consider imposing an affirmative action target. Since the constraint does not bind if employers have homogeneous beliefs, they still set s A = s B = s * (π). By the same logic as above, worker beliefs cannot be homogenous, which is incompatible with π A = π B .
Proof of Proposition 4. If δ B is low enough, affirmative action lowers ever firm's threshold for Bs to some s < s B if beliefs are held constant. 26 Now consider the firm's payoff conditional on a worker application.
Under our assumptions, low enough π B ensures that s * (π B ) = 1. Suppose that π B is above but close to this critical value such that s * (π B ) ≈ 1. The firm's total payoff is then arbitrarily close to zero. The imposition of s < s B adds a strictly positive mass of workers with negative expected payoffs to the firm, ensuring that the total firm payoff from hiring type B workers is negative. As a result, zero firms subsequently invest in the B amenity. In turn, this ensures that no B workers have an incentive to invest.
Lemma. Assume that φ (θ) and τ (ψ) are continuous, strictly decreasing and strictly positive on [0, 1]. For fixed current beliefs with π A > π B , δ A > δ B and t B close enough to one, affirmative action lowers s B for all firms with s A approximately unchanged.
Proof. The Lagrangean for an affirmative action target is as follows.
where ρ (s j , π j ) is the probability that the employer assigns to hiring a randomly drawn worker from group j ∈ {A, B} and P (s j , π j , i j ) is the expected payoff from making an offer to said worker (which depends on whether the firm has invested -i j ∈ {q, u}).
This is enough for us to write down the expressions for the key FOCs.
These can be re-arranged as follows.
These FOCs characterize the firm's signal thresholds for any given investment decision. The threshold t B being close to one means that 1 − F E i B (t B ) is close to zero and all the adjustment occurs on the B side: the multiplier approaches zero in this case. Intuitively, if very few Bs apply then it is nearly costless to adjust on their margin relative to adjustment on the A side.
More formally, we know that the two signals must change in the following proportion to satisfy the affirmative action constraint.
This implies that the change in profits from an increase in s A is proportional to:
Our assumptions on φ (θ) and τ (ψ) imply that as t B → 1, the firm's optimal s A approaches s * (π A ).
Since the affirmative action constraint implies that s B is strictly less than s A , s B > s A without affirmative action and s A is approximately unchanged, s B is lower for all firms with the additional constraint.
Proof of Proposition 5. First note that the firm investment rate is bounded strictly below δ = G E (ω q ) < 1.
With close-to-perfect observability of firm investment, f E q (ψ) → 0 for all ψ < 1 and f E u (ψ) → 0 for all ψ > 0. This implies that for any δ j ∈ 0, δ workers can and will optimally set t = t * (δ j ) such that F E u (t * (δ j )) → 1 and F E q (t * (δ j )) → 0. The mass of workers hired by any firm that only makes one of the two investments must therefore be approximately zero (for both types), which implies that the return to making a single investment is approximately zero. Nearly all firms therefore make both investments or neither, which means that δ A ≈ δ B . Finally, firms that do not invest at all hire approximately zero workers as well.
Combined, this means that as firm investment becomes near-perfectly observable, there is only one type of firm for which the employment quota could lead to different signal thresholds that impact worker investment: firms that make both investments. Specifically, the fraction of workers who invest approaches:
Next, for firms that made both investments, the affirmative action constraint amounts to:
Using π = G W (β W (s, δ)), defineρ (s|δ) as the probability of employment for any given s (fixing δ).
The slope ofρ (s|δ) with respect to s is as follows.
This is always strictly negative if φ (s) ≤ 1, so a sufficient condition for strict monotonicity is thatρ (s|δ) < 0 for all δ ∈ [0, 1] and s : φ (s) > 1. Re-arranging the expression forρ (s|δ), this requirement amounts to the following condition.
But with δ A ≈ δ B , a necessary condition for this is thatρ (s|δ) is non-monotonic. If the above condition is satisfied, this is not possible.
Proof of Proposition 6. Consistent with our proposed dynamic adjustment process, fix beliefs at their original values. Given these beliefs, there are two actions that a firm can take to boost employment of minorities: (a) it can make the B investment if it was not doing so already; and (b) it can lower its hiring standard for B workers. However, if few enough minority workers are applying (i.e., low enough δ B ), a standard of s B = 0 still does not allow the firm to satisfy the employment quota, regardless of its investment decision. Thus, the equality constraint must entail an immediate reduction in employment of type A workers.
Next, consider the firm's choices of s A and s B . The firm's problem can be written as follows.
In principle, there are also constraints that s B ≤ 1, s A ≥ 0 and s A ≤ 1 but these will never bind.
We now proceed to prove that an internal solution does not exist for some values of the parameters.
To do so, assume that the inequality constraint does not bind and let γ be the multiplier on the equality constraint. Differentiating with respect to s A and s B , we obtain expressions for the effect of increasing each threshold.
For low enough δ B , t B → 1 and the maximum hiring probability that a firm can achieve for B worker is ρ H (0, π j , q) = 1 − F E q (t j ) → 0. We therefore also require that ρ (s A , π A , i A ) → 0, which in turn implies that s A → 1. Setting (9) to zero allows us to obtain the limit for the multiplier γ in this scenario.
A sufficient condition for (10) to be strictly less than zero for any value of s B is that λ Next, it is obvious that targeting both investment decisions is effective. If the planner sets δ = δ * and π = π * , workers and firms immediately set s = s * and t = t * . A second effective policy is to set t = t * and π = π * , which ensures that firms set s = s * immediately and δ = δ * in the following period. Analogous logic applies to a policy that sets s = s * and δ = δ * .
Finally, a {δ, π} policy can achieve π * and δ * in exactly one period, while any {t, π} policy must take more than one period if π 0 = π * and t 0 = t * . Intuitively, firms do not change their investment immediately because they have seen no evidence of a change in worker behavior. Similar logic again applies to {s, δ}.
Proof of Proposition 8. First, set government signal thresholds s g ∈ (0, 1) and t g ∈ (0, 1). Next, set worker and firm incentive payments ω g and χ g . LetF W i (θ g ) andF E i (θ g ), i ∈ {q, u}, be the distributions of θ g and ψ g respectively, the increase in investment returns for workers and firms are:
Providing that the government signals are strictly informative, these payments can be set such that the expected returns to investment for B workers and firms investing in the B amenity are equal to those that would prevail at {s A , t A , π A , δ A }. In response, the fraction of B workers who invest is π B = π A and the fraction of firms who invest in the B amenity is δ B = δ A . Then B workers set t = t A and firms s = s A .
Once π B = π A and δ B = δ A have been achieved, they can be retained with only the following permanent investment subsidy.
Clearly λ A = λ B ensures that the required permanent investment subsidy is zero.
Proof of Proposition 9. Assume that G W and G E are strictly increasing with G E (0) = G W (0) = 0, and take any π B ∈ [0, 1) and π A ∈ (0, 1) with π B < π A . These worker investment levels, combined with signal distributions and threshold rules t * and s * pin down firm investment returns for any δ j . The fractions of firms that invest in each amenity are:
Similarly, her wage at her past firm is as follows. 
Since ln a i = c j + ρ ln a OLD i + ln η i , this allows us to write current ability as a function of the past wage.
Finally, we can substitute this measure of ability into the equation for the wage at the current firm to obtain the following regression equation:
Providing that ln ε i , ln ε OLD i and ln η i are uncorrelated with ln w OLD i conditional on the firm fixed effects, it follows directly that the difference in coefficient estimates will be as shown in the proposition.
Derivations
Normalization of Worker Payoffs
A worker will apply for a job if the expected benefit is better than her outside option.
Providing that w q −Ū > 0 andŪ − w u > 0, this amounts to the following condition.
The utility that the individual expects to get from investment is as follows.
The utility from not investing is:
The worker will invest if and only if the following condition holds.
If we normalize the payoffs in this example by defining ω q = w q −Ū and ω u =Ū − w u , these conditions exactly match those discussed in section 3.
Returns in Our Example
The probabilities that a worker sends an unclear signal if he did or did not invest are respectively p q = θu−θq 1−θq . Similarly, the probabilities that an employer sends an unclear signal if he did or did not invest are respectively= ψu−ψq 1−ψq and q u = ψu−ψq ψu . These can be used to derive return to investment for workers and employers.
With the parameter values we provide, these then collapse to the returns we discuss in section 2.1.
Further Extensions of the Model
Endogenous Wages
A. Ex-Post Bargaining
Consider the following modification to the model described in Section 2. Rather than payoffs from a match being fixed at {ω q , ω n , χ q , χ n }, we can add a third stage at which worker and firm investment decisions become common knowledge. To model the bargaining process, we assume for simplicity that total worker and firm payoffs are linear in monetary transfers that can be made between the two parties. The firm and worker investment decisions i W , i E ∈ {q, u} determine the total surplus to be split, x i W ,i E . Workers receive a fixed fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of this surplus.
Workers can, at the time of application, exercise a more valuable outside option w i W 0 if they invested than if they did not, with an equivalent assumption regarding the outside option for firms x i E 0 . However, at the time of bargaining, the outside options of both parties are zero. To exactly replicate the payoff structure of our baseline model, further assume that the benefit to workers (resp. firms) from being matched to a good firm (resp. worker) is independent of their own investment decision. This allows us to define ω q , ω u , χ q , χ u .
Finally, if the lowest worker cost is c ≥ w q 0 − w u 0 and the lowest firm cost is k ≥ x q 0 − x u 0 then this structure exactly replicates our baseline model. It is possible to relax some of these assumptions without any qualitative changes to the model. For α) x uu then the firm hiring threshold would depend on whether the firm invested. This does not introduce any substantive change to our results. The restriction that firm and worker costs are bounded above zero is more important, but also sensible: without it, a worker would have an incentive to invest even if doing so never increased the probability of being hired.
B. Wage Equals Marginal Product
We assumed throughout the analysis that net worker and firm payoffs are exogenous parameters. We show above that this payoff structure can be rationalized by ex-post bargaining. Here, we instead explore the possibility of variable wage offers at the hiring stage. Specifically, we consider a simple benchmark model in which workers are paid their marginal product, although investment remains binary. The resulting policy implications are qualitatively the same as those of our baseline model.
Model
Begin by assuming that output (with a price normalized to one) is produced at constant returns to scale using a mass of qualified workers Q j , combined with group-specific 'capital's provided by the firm K j . For convenience, we adopt a Cobb-Douglas specification for each group.
We can derive the average product of a worker by dividing by the total labor force L j = Q j + U j where Q j is the mass of qualified workers, U j is the mass of unqualified workers and S i = Q j /L j is the share of qualified workers.
Mirroring the assumptions of our baseline model, the firm can choose to provide exactly one unit or zero units of capital per worker for each group j ∈ {A, B} so that K j /L j ∈ {0, 1} depending on which investments the firm chooses to make. If the firm doesn't invest, no output is produced for that group.
Next, we can derive the marginal product of a worker. For a qualified group j worker at a firm that made the group j investment, the marginal product is:
The marginal product for a worker who did not invest is zero, since such workers never add value to production. This implies, given the same signal structure as in our baseline model, that a random worker's expected marginal product -which we assume is also the wage that a firm offers -is as follows.
κ (π j , θ) γS γ−1 j = w (π j , θ) ≥ 0
Assuming that workers have no outside option, they are always willing to accept this offer, since it is always weakly positive.
Aggregating up, the share of qualified workers is just π j . This means that the average wage payment for group j is γπ γ j . Thus, the revenue that the firm earns per worker, net of wage payments, is λ j (1 − γ) π γ j . The fraction of firms who invest is therefore given by:
Since a fraction δ j of firms made the group j investment, the return to investment for group j workers is simply δ j multiplied by impact that worker investment has on the average wage offer. Thus, the fraction of workers of group j who invest is as follows.
Clearly if δ j = 0, then the return to investment is zero. Similarly, if π j = 0, then there is no return to investment because the wage is zero for any signal.
Discriminatory Equilibria
Since this model can have multiple equilibria, there is potential for an equilibrium in which there is zero investment by Bs and positive investment by As. If π B = 0, firms would never offer a positive wage to B workers here, since κ (π j , θ) = 0. In turn, this means that there is never an incentive for workers to invest.
Since hiring a B worker never adds to output, the return to B investment for firms is zero as well. Thus δ B = 0. Turning to the A market, if π A > 0, wages are positive and the fraction of A workers who invest is as follows.
The return to investment for firms is also positive, and a fraction δ A invest.
We can prove that there can be such an equilibrium by positing a value of π A , and a function G E such that δ A > 0. For any such π A and δ A , there is some function G W that that satisfies our assumptions and which yields the required worker investment levels.
Symmetric Investment
We next examine the conditions under which a non-discriminatory equilibrium exists. Assume that π A = π B = π. This means that the fraction of workers who invest (for both types) is:
If G W is strictly increasing and δ j > 0, than this fraction can only be the same for both groups if δ A = δ B = δ.
However, the return to investment for firms is δ = G E (λ j [(1 − γ) π γ ]). If G E is strictly increasing, then firm investment levels cannot be the same for both groups unless λ A = λ B . This precludes π A = π B = π if λ A = λ B , implying that an equilibrium with positive investment but no discrimination is impossible.
Affirmative Action
One definition of affirmative action in this model is a requirement that the average wage paid to workers, conditional on their being hired, is equal across groups. The second question we can ask is whether it is possible for this type of AA to lead to homogeneous beliefs. First, note that π A = π B = π implies that wages are identical across groups for every θ and that affirmative action does not bind.
w (π, θ) = κ (π, θ) γπ γ−1
Assuming again that G W and G E are strictly increasing, a requirement for positive and equal rates of worker investment is again that δ A = δ B = δ, which is only possible if λ A = λ B . Otherwise, affirmative action again has no prospect of eliminating discrimination in equilibrium.
Investment Insurance
Our main policy prescription, two-sided investment insurance, is similarly effective in the model with variable wages. Assume initially that Bs are a numerical minority (λ B ≤ λ A ) and that they are in an inferior equilibrium compared to As: π A > π B . This implies that wages are lower for this group.
w (π A , θ) = κ (π A , θ) γπ γ−1 A < κ (π B , θ) γπ γ−1 B = w (π B , θ)
Assuming that G E is strictly increasing, it also implies that firm investment is lower.
As we did in our baseline model, imagine that the government has access to its signals of worker and firm investment: θ g and ψ g , which satisfy the same assumptions as θ and ψ in our baseline model. The government can use these signals to target potentially variable "wage" payments to workers, with similar incentive payments for firms. This must be effective here as well, because large enough wage payments can achieve any investment return for both workers and firms.
Consider the following policy, which will lead to immediate elimination of discrimination. First, set government wages w g (θ) such that the fraction of Bs who invest is π A .
Similarly, set weakly positive payments p g (ψ) firms such that the fraction who invest is δ A .
Once this has been achieved, firms will set w (π A , θ) = w (π B , θ). This will ensure that π B,t+1 = π A with no subsidy, and it can be removed. The aggregate firm investment subsidy that is still required to maintain equal firm investment returns is as follows.
Thus, if λ A = λ B then p g (ψ) = 0 for all ψ: i.e., no investment subsidy is needed. Otherwise, some level of firm investment subsidy must be maintained to preserve an equilibrium without homogenous beliefs.
Marginal Firm Investment Costs
In our baseline model, we assumed that firms paid a fixed cost k j for each investment that they chose to make.
Here we provide intuition for an alternative case in which the cost of investing in group j is proportional to the number of workers from group j who end up being hired. With this assumption, there is no longer an inherent disadvantage to being a minority. The model is otherwise unchanged in most respects.
With this change, the investment cost is only paid for workers who apply and receive offers from the firm.
Thus, the expected investment cost for a given group is as follows.
λ 1 − F E q (t * (δ)) · π 1 − F W q (s * (π)) + (1 − π) 1 − F W u (s * (π)) · k
The returns to investment are unchanged. For any equilibrium without zero investment, the fraction of firms who invest is therefore as follows.
Compared to the baseline model, the net return to investment is scaled up by to proportion of workers hired.
It is obvious from equation (11) that the returns to firm investment, and the fraction of firms who invest, are both independent of the population fraction λ. This is enough to conclude that for otherwise identical groups, the set of equilibria no longer depends on population size. In this sense, if investment costs are marginal, there is no inherent disadvantage to being a member of a minority group.
Aside from this point, the change in assumptions does not substantively change the model. Compared to our baseline, firm investment returns are scaled up by a factor that varies with δ and π. As δ and π both approach one the denominator in equation (11) is simply λ. At lower levels, returns are further scaled up, since costs are only paid for individuals who are hired.
Despite this change, the zero investment equilibrium clearly exists and is stable. With the same regularity assumptions as we adopt for our existence proposition, the firm will set its signal threshold to one if π falls below some low but positive level. Similarly, if δ falls below some positive critical value, no workers apply.
As long as π and δ are low enough, there is therefore no incentive for any firm or worker to invest. Similarly, other equilibria may still exist, although stability and existence are much more complex to verify.
